Between 2022 and 2023, a number of EU and non-EU Member States are seeking agreements with third countries to outsource the procedures for examining asylum applications of migrants already on their territory or intending to enter it. This is the case for the UK with Rwanda and Italy with Albania. These arrangements are designed to provide the public with apparently quick and effective solutions to reduce migratory pressure on the West. In reality, a careful examination of the two agreements in the light of the many legal constraints in force raises many questions about the appropriateness of taking “shortcuts” that may not only prove legally difficult to implement but may also turn out to be extremely counterproductive for the political and institutional actors trying to implement them, leading to effects opposite to those desired.
Tra il 2022 ed il 2023 alcuni Stati, membri dell’UE e non, stanno provando a sancire accordi con Paesi terzi per esternalizzare le procedure di esame delle domande di asilo dei migranti già presenti sul loro territorio nazionale o che intendono entrarvi. È il caso del Regno Unito con il Ruanda e dell’Italia con l’Albania. Questi accordi vogliono fornire all’opinione pubblica soluzioni apparentemente rapide ed efficaci per ridurre la pressione migratoria sull’Occidente. In realtà, un esame attento dei due accordi alla luce dei tanti vincoli giuridici vigenti solleva molti interrogativi sull’opportunità di intraprendere “scorciatoie” che possono non soltanto risultare difficilmente praticabili sul piano giuridico, ma anche di rivelarsi estremamente controproducenti per i soggetti politici ed istituzionali che provano a percorrerle, determinando effetti opposti a quelli auspicati
Gli accordi bilaterali di esternalizzazione dei migranti: l’Occidente tra diritti umani, coerenza e sindrome Nimby
Andrea De Petris
2024-01-01
Abstract
Between 2022 and 2023, a number of EU and non-EU Member States are seeking agreements with third countries to outsource the procedures for examining asylum applications of migrants already on their territory or intending to enter it. This is the case for the UK with Rwanda and Italy with Albania. These arrangements are designed to provide the public with apparently quick and effective solutions to reduce migratory pressure on the West. In reality, a careful examination of the two agreements in the light of the many legal constraints in force raises many questions about the appropriateness of taking “shortcuts” that may not only prove legally difficult to implement but may also turn out to be extremely counterproductive for the political and institutional actors trying to implement them, leading to effects opposite to those desired.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.